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THE PROBLEM OF EXECUTION
UNIFORMITY UNDER THE FOREIGN
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976
AND FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 69
INTRODUCTION
The American doctrine of sovereign immunity was first ex-
pressed in the 1812 case The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden.1 In
this case the Supreme Court held that unless Congress directs
otherwise courts are bound by the "implied promise" that foreign
sovereigns are exempt from United States jurisdiction. Today, by
enacting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,2 the United
States officially joins the majority of countries which applies the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.' As generally adopted the
restrictive theory removes a sovereign's exemption from suit and in
certain circumstances allows one country's jurisdiction to be
asserted over another.' The United States codification of the restric-
tive theory of sovereign immunity is phrased in terms of exceptions
to the general rule that sovereigns are immune from United States
1. 7 Cranch 116 (1812).
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441, 1602-11 (1976).
3. J. SWEENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 22 (1963).
Sweeney dates the adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity of the
following countries: Argentina (1941), Austria (1950), Belgium (1903), Egypt (1912),
France (1929), Germany (1957), Greece (1928), Italy (1926), Switzerland (1918).
The doctrine of sovereign immunity rests on two principles: (1) par in parem
non habet jurisdictionem -that legal persons of equal standing cannot have their
disputes settled in the courts of one of them and, (2) on the principle of non-
intervention that precludes interference in the internal affairs of other foreign coun-
tries. I. BROWNLIE. PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 315 (2d ed. 1973).
4. "BROWNLIE. supra note 3, at 316. In contrast to the restrictive theory, the
absolute theory of sovereign immunity totally precludes any assertion of jurisdiction
over another foreign country whether for public or private acts. Interestingly, though
the immunity is absolute, it may be waived. BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 316. See
generally 6 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 353-8 (1968).
It appears that the Soviet Union and some of the African states are the last
adherents to the absolute theory of sovereign immunity. The Soviet Union, however,
waives its immunity under several multilateral treaties. See, e.g., SWEENEY. supra note
3, at 20-23.
The United Kingdom, long-time advocate of the absolute theory, has only recent-
ly adopted the "restrictive view;" see, e.g., Committee Report: The Sovereign Immuni-
ty Act of 1975, A.B.A. JOURNAL OF N.Y. 478, n.1l (1976).
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jurisdiction. Under the Act a sovereign's affirmative defense of im-
munity may not bar suit in the limited cases where the foreign state
either waives its immunity, carries on commercial activities related
to the United States or commits certain torts.' Additionally, the new
Act creates exceptions from immunity for foreign assets and allows
execution on those assets to satisfy judgments regardless of the
sovereign's willingness to pay.'
Although most foreign states agree that sovereign nations are
subject to suit, their current use of the restrictive theory of immuni-
ty differs from that of the United States. As adopted by other
foreign countries, the restrictive theory of immunity draws a
distinction between "private acts" and "public acts" of the
sovereign. According to this variation of the theory the assertion of
jurisdiction is permissible only for private sovereign acts (acte ges-
tionis) which are generally commercial. Further, these countries
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976) provides:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States
is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be im-
mune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the
States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) provides:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts
of the United States or of the States in any case in which the action is
based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the
foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect
in the United States.
Unless the contacts with sections 1605 to 1607 are met, the sovereign will remain im-
mune from United States jurisdiction.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (1976).
7. The term "private acts" refers to commercial acts of a foreign state that
are such as may be performed by private persons. "Public acts" are those acts which
the foreign state performs in its official capacity, as in raising armies. The Act does
away with the public or private act distinction and looks instead to the commercial
nature of the activity. See S. REP. No. 94-1310, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16
(1976) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT], reprinted in 5 U.S. CODE CONG., AND AD.
NEWS 6604 (1976).
A different focus of these definitions is found in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE
FORIEIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 69, Comment a (1965), which looks to
the "purpose" of the activity. The distinction between public and private acts has been
drawn since the first century A.D. See Setser, The Immunities Of The State And
Government Economic Activities, 24 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 291, 293 (1959): "[I1n the
Roman Empire, where governmental authority was exalted to the highest degree, the
state in its property relationship was suable in the courts."
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still allow the immunity defense for public acts (acte imperii) which
are diplomatic, legislative or military in nature.' A major difference
between practices of the United States and other countries which
follow the restrictive theory is that the United States is virtually
alone in its attempt to enforce its judgments.9 The Act provides for
enforced execution without a treaty and is thus a unique extension
of the restrictive view.
In effect the new United States Act creates a private
act-public act distinction since a sovereign's potentially public acts
are not included in the exceptions creating United States jurisdic-
tion. Therefore, foreign states remain immune from United States
jurisdiction and execution in connection with diplomatic, legislative
and military acts even though the Act does not draw the public-
private distinction. In fact the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
abolishes the prior American judicial practice of characterizing
foreign acts as private or public. I"
The restrictive theory of immunity has been in practical force
in the United States since 1952 when the State Department publish-
ed a directive called the "Tate Letter."" The "Tate Letter" was an
attempt to bring United States policy in line with prevailing interna-
tional practice by recognizing the distinction between a sovereign's
public and private acts. 2 That directive proclaims that the doctrine
8. BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 323; S. SUCHARITKUL, STATE IMMUNITIES AND
TRADING ACTIVITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 255 (1959); 6 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 714 (1968).
9. See BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 301: "[Tlhe United States government, and
foreign governments .. . assume that there are certain limits to enforcement jurisdic-
tion but there is no consensus on what those limits are." (Emphasis in original.)
Sweeney notes that a few cases sanctioning execution exist in Austria,
Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, France, Italy and Switzerland. SWEENEY, supra note 3.
at vi.
In this connection, it must be noted that the United States government pro-
hibits execution on its property. See 31 U.S.C. § 724(a) (1970); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2414,
2517(a), 2518 (1970).
10. This idea surfaces in the following congressional reports: SENATE REPORT,
supra note 7, at 10-11; HOUSE REPORT. supra note 7, at 9.
11. Letter of Jack Tate, then acting Legal Advisor to the State Department
to Philip B. Perlman, then Attorney General (May 19, 1952). reprinted in Change Of
Policy On Sovereign Immunity Of Foreign Governments, 26 DEPT. STATE BULL. 969
(1952).
12. In National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955), the
Supreme Court sanctioned the new view of sovereign immunity, holding that China's
default was a "public" and therefore immune act. Yet, the Court allowed set-off on
other grounds. The State Department had expressed no views in the case. Justices
Reed, Burton and Clark dissented because the United States had not enacted a statute
1978]
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of sovereign immunity need not bar the assertion of a court's
jurisdiction over private or commercial acts of a foreign country.13
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act corrects four deficiencies in
the "Tate Letter." First, before denying sovereign immunity,
American courts seek the justifying legislation they feel The
Schooner Exchange mandates." Second, the "Tate Letter" provides
no standard by which a court can distinguish between private and
public acts.15 Third, courts are troubled by the State Department's
practice of suggesting whether sovereign immunity applies before
decisions on the merits." The discretionary suggestions of the State
Department are especially troublesome where judicial precedent
calls for an opposite conclusion.17 Finally, the only way to obtain
jurisdiction under the "Tate Letter" is to attach assets of the
foreign state quasi in rem.i" Even assuming a successful suit by a
restricting China's sovereign immunity. For an earlier case, see Republic of Mexico v.
Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945). Here, the State Department had denied Mexico's request
for immunity in a suit on a damaged vessel and the Supreme Court refused to
recognize the immunity, saying, "[iut is therefore not for the courts to deny an immuni-
ty which our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new
grounds which the government has not seen fit to recognize." Id. at 35. State Depart-
ment suggestions were thus considered binding. See also Victory Transport v. Com-
isaria Gen. Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 934 (1965).
13. This distinction was difficult to draw since the "Tate Letter" did not pre-
sent any standard for judging the difference between private and public acts. See
Lowenfeld, The Sabbatino Amendment-International Law Meets Civil Procedure, 59
AM. J. OF INT'L LAW 899, 905 (1965).
14. See, e.g., National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 368 (1955)
(dissenting opinion). See also Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba, - U.S.
__ , 96 S. Ct. 1854, 1876 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting): "The restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity has not been adopted by this Court .. " These statements
necessarily predate the enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.
The Act now codifies the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. SENATE REPORT,
supra note 7, at 9; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 7.
15. See Lowenfeld, The Sabbatino Amendment-International Law Meets
Civil Procedure, 59 AM. J. OF INT'L LAW 899, 905 (1965).
16. See note 12 supra.
17. See, e.g., Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961). The
court did not recognize Cuba's immunity since the guidelines of the "Tate Letter" did
not mandate it. The State Department, however, suggested immunity because it was
privately negotiating with Cuba.
18. Attachment for quasi in rem jurisdiction was permitted by the "Tate Let-
ter." See Falk, The Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns In United States
Courts-Proposed Legislation, 6 N.Y.U. J. OF INT'L LAW AND POL. 473, 495 (1973). See
also SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 9, 26; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 8, 26. At-
tachment for jurisdiction is now prohibited by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
28 U.S.C. § 16i0(d)(2) (1976): "the purpose of the attachment is . .. not to obtain
jurisdiction."
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plaintiff, those attached foreign assets can never be used to satisfy
the judgment'9 because the "Tate Letter" does not contain execution
provisions. Thus despite an adjudication on the merits it was said
that the plaintiffs day in court was an "empty gesture."' These dif-
ficulties caused judicial application of the restrictive theory to pro-
ceed uneasily under the executive branch guidelines.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act now codifies the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.2' By making questions of
immunity justiciable issues the Act frees the courts from State
Department suggestion.22  Boldly, the Act grants in personam
jurisdiction over foreign states 3 and allows for execution in aid of
19. Dexter and Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyerelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d
Cir. 1930). The court held that it could not compel the Swedish Government to pay its
judgment, although it settled out of court in 1933. See W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW
636 (3d ed. 1971). Contra, United States v. Harris and Co. Advertising, Inc., 149 So. 2d
384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (State Department intervened too late and foreign chat-
tels were sold at judicial sale). See also Bradford v. Chase National Bank, 24 F. Supp.
28 (S.D.N.Y 1938).
20. See Letter of Richard Kleindienst, Secretary of State, to the President of
the Senate (Jan. 22, 1973), reprinted in 119 CONG. REC. 2215:
Under the present law, a plaintiff who is able to bring his action against a
foreign state because it relates to a commercial act ... may be denied the
fruits of his judgment against the foreign state. The immunity of a
foreign state from execution has remained absolute.
See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 9: "[A] foreign state enjoys absolute
immunity from execution, even in ordinary commercial litigation where commercial
assets are available for the satisfaction of a judgment." Countervailing reasons for ex-
ecution naturally existed long ago: "An execution is the end of the law. It gives the
successful party the fruits of his judgment." United States v. Nourse, 34 U.S. 8, 28
(1835).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976). See also SENATE REPORT. supra note 7, at 9; HOUSE
REPORT. supra note 7, at 7.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976), provides in part:
The Congress finds that the determination by United States courts of the
claims of foreign states to immunity from the jurisdiction of such courts
would serve the interests of justice and would protect the rights of both
foreign states and litigants in United States courts.
See also Department of State Notice, 41 Fed. Reg. 50, 883-4 (1976), wherein the
Department states that it will no longer make sovereign immunity determinations
after Jan. 19, 1977: "After [the act] takes effect, the Executive Branch will, of course,
play the same role in sovereign immunity cases that it does in other types of litiga-
tion-e.g., appearing as amicus curiae in cases of significant
interest.. : ."
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976). This new section, added by the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to
amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state
as defined in section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in per-
19781
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judgment on commercially held assets in the United States.24 For
the first time in American history a plaintiff who succeeds on the
merits against a foreign sovereign will have a statutory right to
satisfaction of his judgment.
To eliminate the unsatisfactory "private act-public act" distinc-
tion of the "Tate Letter" the Act creates a test for the sufficiency of
commercial "contacts" with the United States.25 This test applies to
only two categories of exceptions: the immunity defense does not
bar jurisdiction or execution in aid of judgment when foreign com-
mercial contacts are found. These exceptions may be determined by
either a state court or a federal district court.26 The Act may be in-
herently defective, however, because it grants concurrent jurisdic-
tion to state courts and federal courts.
This note examines the judicial powers to execute judgments
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, pursuant to
rule 69 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Though no pro-
cedures for judgment execution are contained in the Act, both the
Senate and the House of Representatives stated in their analyses
that rule 69 was controlling.28 This means that the procedures of
judgment execution under the Act will be those of the state in
which the suit against a foreign sovereign is heard. The variations
in these procedures must be carefully examined to provide any
sonam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity
either under sections 1605-1607 of this title or under any applicable inter-
national agreement.
See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 9; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 7.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (1976). See also SENATE REPORT ,supra note 7, at 9, 26-30;
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 7, 27-30.
25. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1610, which detail the exceptions to the general
rule of immunity from, respectively, jurisdiction and execution. See also SENATE
REPORT, supra note 7, at 17; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 17.
26. Federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act: "Plaintiffs ... will have an election whether to proceed in
Federal court or in a court of a state .. " SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 12. See
also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 13.
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 69 provides in part:
Process to enforce a judgment for the payment of money shall be a writ
of execution, unless the court directs otherwise. The procedure on execu-
tion, in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of a judgment, and in
proceedings on and in aid of execution shall be in accordance with the
practice and procedure of the state in which the district court is held,
existing at the time the remedy is sought, except that any statute of the
United States governs to the extent that it is applicable.
28. SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 27; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 28.
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potential party to a foreign suit an outline of subtleties and pitfalls
not apparent on the face of the Act.
In contrast to this application of divergent state practices, the
congressional desire to promote uniform treatment of foreign
sovereigns in United States courts' must be explored. Congress is
expressly cognizant of "the importance of developing a uniform body
of law in this area."30 Uniformity is a central policy goal here as both
the Senate and the House have noted that the institution of suits
against foreign states involves "potential sensitivity."3' Moreover,
the Act's endorsement of enforced execution goes a step beyond ac-
cepted international practice. Nonuniformity in the procedures of ex-
ecuting judgments against foreign sovereigns can lead to foreign
disrespect of United States law and to strained foreign relations.
For these reasons the Act reflects deference to sovereigns by mak-
ing certain foreign assets immune from execution,"2 and by recogniz-
ing the superior status of foreign states over their agencies." In
general the Act is an attempt to strike a balance between the
policies of uniformity and deference and the goal of judgment
satisfaction for United States nationals. It will be demonstrated that
the use of rule 69 to effect the execution provisions of the Act can-
not meet these desired congressional goals. State law, which is the
law of judgment execution applied under rule 69, is notoriously
multifarious.u Varying judgment lives, capacities for renewal or
29. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 12:
Such broad jurisdiction in the Federal courts should be conducive to
uniformity in decision, which is desirable since a disparate treatment of
cases involving foreign governments may have adverse foreign relations
consequences.
See also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 13.
30. SENATE REPORT supra note 7, at 32; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 32.
31. Id.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1611 (1976).
33. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1608, 1610 (1976). "States" as used in this note follows
the definition of § 1603 of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. Section
1603(a) of the Act provides in part:
A "foreign state," except as used in section 1608 of this title, includes a
political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state as defined in subsection (b).
Explicit reference to the several states of the United States will be made when
applicable.
34. R. MEHREN, ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN COUNTRY JUDGMENTS 50 (1974):
"Each of the 50 states has its own detailed rules governing the procedures and
remedies available to enforce its judgments." See generally S. RIESENFELD, CREDITORS'
REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION (2d ed. 1975); D. EPSTEIN, DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELA-
TIONS (1973).
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revival and differing time limits on liens are among the many pro-
cedural differences extant in state execution laws. It may be that
the policy of uniform treatment of foreign sovereigns in United
States courts can be assured only by amending the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act. An amendment could include not only a
grant of exclusive jurisidiction to federal courts but also a federal
execution provision that is unhampered by the diversity of state
law.
This analysis of the clash between policy and practice examines
rule 69 and the execution provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act. The execution procedures operative in state courts is
then described. After this background is established the problem of
uniformity is considered, with emphasis placed on the justification
for an amendment to the new Act. Before examining the execution
provisions it is worthwhile to briefly explore the Act's new grant of
jurisdiction to American courts.
JURISDICTION UNDER THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
The "Tate Letter" authorized the practice of attaching foreign
assets to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction. With enactment of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act the nature and scope of a court's
jurisdiction over foreign states dramatically changed. The Act
eliminates the use of attachment to obtain jurisdiction' and instead,
asserts in personam jurisdiction over foreign states, their political
subdivisions and their agencies and instrumentalities." While the ex-
pansion of jurisdiction is a salutary effort to aline judicial powers
with the Act's execution provisions, a problem develops because the
Act differentiates between foreign states and foreign agencies for
purposes of service of process, subject matter of the suit and the ex-
ecution of judgments.
The Foreign State-Foreign Agency Distinction
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act appears to substitute a
new problem for an old one: the private act-public act classifica-
tions are abrogated but an initial jurisdictional determination must
still be made as to whether a foreign state or agency is before the
court. The anomalous situation occurs because service of process,
the permissible subject matter of the suit, and any subsequent ex-
ecution all hinge on the foreign state-foreign agency distinction.
The Act does not, however, distinguish between states and agencies
35. See note 18 supra.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976).
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when defining exceptions to immunity from jurisdiction." Unfor-
tunately, the Act does not suggest any standard by which to judge
the difference between state and agency activity, thus creating a
new judicial problem. This problem is magnified by the very nature
of most foreign agencies: they exist as arms of the states which
create them and function only as foreign states direct."
Though accepted in many countries, the restrictive theory of
immunity has up to now related primarily to the issue of jurisdic-
tion. In asserting jurisdiction according to their interpretation of the
theory, other nations do not distinguish between states and agencies
but do distinguish between private and public sovereign acts.39
Among the civil law nations, agencies which are part of the govern-
ment receive governmental immunity while those agencies with
separate legal status and corporations in which the government has
a slight interest generally do not." In common law states, the deter-
mination of agency immunity is left to the forum and depends on the
relationship between the agency and its state.'1 Some corporations
in these common law countries receive immunity even though they
operate "on the same basis and in the same manner as an agency of
the state." 2 In all cases great weight attaches to the views of the
foreign state."
One noted international author calls the Act's foreign state-
foreign agency distinction a drafting error." It is submitted that the
Act maintains this distinction out of deference to sovereigns because
of the diplomatically sensitive nature of foreign suits. The fact that
the United States attempts unilateral execution without the usual
formalities of a treaty is an additional reason for recognizing any
potential differences between the legislative or military activities of
states and the purely commercial activities of some foreign agencies.
Whether included by accident or by design, the Foreign Sovereign
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976).
38. See Falk, supra note 18, at 493. Query what a United States court would
do with the foreign state-foreign agency distinction if one state acted as agent for
another. This does not apply to domesticated agencies that are owned by a foreign
state, as such agencies are treated as corporations under United States law. See
SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 32; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 32. Falk has
criticized this analogy to United States corporations, Falk, supra note 18, at 493.
39. See Falk, supra note 18, at 493.




44. Falk, supra note 18, at 493.
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Immunities Act distinguishes between foreign states and their agen-
cies. Though the line between foreign state and agency activity may
be a fine one, state and federal courts may utilize both domestic and
international law in making this determination. 5 Furthermore, it
should not be too difficult for the foreign state defendant to prove
its status as the presumption of sovereign immunity remains in ef-
fect until the sufficient commercial nexus with the United States is
found.
The Commercial Test For Jurisdiction
The sufficiency of commercial contacts with the United States
is a crucial issue upon which hangs the power of the court to assert
personal jurisdiction. As a practical matter, application of the com-
mercial test settles the question of whether the suit is against the
foreign state or its agency. Should a court decide that the agency or
state does not have the requisite commercial contacts the sovereign
immunity defense applies automatically. When, however, the foreign
state waives its immunity or satisfies a nexus test of commercial ac-
tivity with the United States, jurisdictional immunity does not app-
ly. An explicit waiver of sovereign immunity may arise from a
treaty 6 and implicit waivers are often found in agreements to ar-
bitrate 7 or in such actions as the filing of a responsive pleading."5
Additionally, a foreign state may waive the immunity of its political
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities because their sovereign-
ty is said to derive from the larger state entity. 9
45. In determining the sufficiency of commercial contacts with the United
States, state and federal courts may also apply standards of international law. SENATE
REPORT, supra note 7, at 14; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 14. International law may
also be applied in determining what constitutes "a violation of international law" under
Sections 1605 and 1610 of the Act.
It may, however, be difficult to determine what international law is. See, e.g.,
Wilson, The International Law Standard In United States Statutes, 69 AM. J. OF INT'L
L. 848, 851 (1975) (concluding that the United States frequently asserts "in its legisla-
tion the applicability of international law in general terms, without indicating what
that law is believed to be or the manner in which it is or may become relevant").
See also BROWNLIE, supra note 3. at 57:
When points of international law arise in a municipal court, and resort to
the executive for guidance does not occur, the court will commonly face
real difficulty in obtaining reliable evidence . . . of the state of the law,
and especially the customary law....
46. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605(a)(1) (1976).
47. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 9; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 9.
48. Id
49. Id See 6 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INT'L LAW 353-8 (1968).
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Personal jurisdiction also extends to cases dealing with non-
commercial torts,0 rights in immovable property"' and maritime
liens.2 Further, the Act expressly declares that foreign states and
agencies are subject to actions involving counterclaims and setoffs.
In three contexts sovereign immunity does not bar suit against the
foreign state or agency that engages in commercial activities with
the United States. First, an American court may assert its jurisdic-
tion when the sovereign carries on a commercial activity within the
United States.' Second, jurisdiction extends to those sovereign acts
performed in the United States in connection with a commercial ac-
tivity located outside the United States. Finally, the sovereign im-
munity defense does not bar suit on sovereign acts that have a
"direct effect in the United States" regardless of the fact that the
act complained of occurs outside the United States in connection
with a commercial activity located outside the United States.5' It is
unclear how far United States jurisdiction extends abroad to effect
the execution of judgments when foreign states and agencies have
no property in the United States and the basis of the claim centers
on an act having only "a direct effect" in the United States. This
provision is one example of the latent extraterritorial nature of the
new law-an affront to the sovereignty of the affected countries.'
Other less subtle problems exist with the commercial test. A
foreign state or agency could conceivably prove that despite com-
mercial contacts with the United States the primary purpose of the
activity was to serve an unassailable state function such as boycot-
ting commercial enterprises. Sovereigns are immune from suit if
engaged in military or public debt activities,"' but the list of im-
munities may lengthen if courts permit sovereigns to plead "public
act" in order to escape jurisdiction after fulfilling the necessary
commercial contacts. The Act attempts to eliminate considerations
of public acts and purposes of activities by focusing on the commer-
cial nexus. However, American courts may revert to the time-
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1976).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(aX4) (1976).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(b) (1976).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(aX2) (1976).
54. Id.
55. Id
56. Brownlie notes that while, in theory, a state cannot enforce its national
laws on the territory of another State without the latter's consent, in fact, states
acquiesce in some extraterritorial enforcement. BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 299. A well-
known example of extraterritorial application is the United States antitrust law.
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1611 (1976).
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honored distinction between a sovereign's private and public acts in
order to decide whether the suit involves a foreign state or agency
even before the commercial test applies.
The Act addresses the serious question of foreign expropria-
tion or nationalization of American property by extending jurisdic-
tion in limited instances to cover rights in property taken in viola-
tion of international law.58 Generally, expropriations violate interna-
tional law when the taking is not "in the public interest" and no
"prompt, adequate and effective" compensation is paid.59 Here the
Act's deference to sovereigns surfaces in a clear distinction between
foreign states and agencies. Congress denies immunity to foreign
states when the concerned property is within the United States in
connection with a foreign state's commercial activity.' When a
foreign agency owns property taken in violation of international law
and that agency engages in commercial activity in the United States
a court may apply its jurisdiction even though the disputed property
is not located within the United States."
The problems raised by foreign expropriations involve other
state defenses unrelated to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. One
such defense is the "act of state" doctrine, by which foreign courts
may not question sovereign acts performed in sovereign territory.2
At one time the defense created a presumption that courts could not
"sit in judgment" on some activities of a sovereign and effectively
made expropriation cases nonjusticiable in the United States.
To correct the adverse effects of the "act of state" doctrine,
Congress passed the "Sabbatino Amendment" to the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1964.1 This amendment directs courts to apply in-
58. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(aX3), 1610 (a) and (b) (1976).
59. 8 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INT'L LAW 1143-85 (1967); See also BROWNLIE,
supra note 3, at 518. See 22 U.S.C. § 2181 (1968) (guaranty of payment for American
expropriation losses abroad).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(aX3) (1976).
61. Id.
62. The doctrine, announced in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252
(1897), is that "[elvery sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of the government of another done within its own territory."
63. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1964). See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398 (1964); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), affd
383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 957 (1968) (deciding Sabbatino after
enactment of the "Sabbatino Amendment").
See also Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlansche- Amerikaansche, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir.
1954). In Bernstein the court originally granted immunity to the acts of state of the
Nazi Regime. The State Department then "suggested" that immunity need not be
recognized, creating the famous "Bernstein Exception" to the act of state doctrine.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 3 [1978], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol12/iss3/4
INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS
ternational law and to decide cases on the merits notwithstanding
the defense.' American presidents have authority under the amend-
ment to suggest that the defense be recognized by the courts if it is
within the foreign policy interest of the United States." While the
"act of state" defense no longer precludes adjudication of expropria-
tion cases, the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act does preclude suit
when property is expropriated outside the United States by a
foreign government because the commercial test is not met. Thus
the more crucial aspects of expropriation in violation of interna-
tional law are not dealt with by the Act.
Despite the Act's omissions and failure to standardize the
foreign state-foreign agency distinction, the commercial test is a
workable definition of the scope of in personam jurisdiction. Other
countries following the restrictive theory of immunity can readily
see the reflection of their own jurisdictional practices in the Act's
commercial basis. However, because American states have no status
in international law16 the Act's grant of concurrent jurisdiction to
state and federal courts may be offensive to foreign nations even
though they agree with the underlying assertion of jurisdiction over
their commercial activities within the United States.
Where and How Suits Against Foreign Sovereigns May Commence
Foreign states recognize the sovereignty and legitimacy of the
American federal system. The American states, however, are not
owed the same duty of recognition. 7 With possibly one exception no
other nation in the world maintains the American distinction be-
tween federal and state judiciaries." However, under the Act, state
64. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1964).
65. Id. See also Trelles, The Act Of State Doctrine: The Interaction Of
Domestic And International Factors-Some Observations And Suggestions, 1 U. OF
DAYTON L. REV. 121, 136-7 (1976):
[Ilt appears that extra-legal factors will be ever present and exerting
pressure upon the courts when litigation occurs dealing with matters of
international significance . . . . The judiciary in the United States is
caught between administering international law and giving comity to
foreign nations' acts.
66. See BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 73. See Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 AM. J. OF INrL L. 740, 743 (1939): "The
several states of the union are entities unknown to international law. It would be as
unsound as it would be unwise to make our state courts our ultimate authority for pro-
nouncing the rules of international law."
67. See generally W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 314 (3d ed. 1962).
68. Id. The possible exception is the Swiss cantons which may have a few
international dealings.
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and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over suits brought
by or against foreign sovereigns. This means that foreign states
must now submit to the judicial complexities of fifty states, the
District of Columbia and the federal system-a result that is ill-
designed to effect the congressional goal of uniform treatment for
sovereign states. As this discussion proceeds it will become ap-
parent that concurrent jurisdiction carries a seed of unpredictabili-
ty.
The adequacy of notice of suit and the propriety of jurisdiction
are two separately justiciable issues under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act." Service of process upon a foreign state or its
political subdivision is accomplished by either delivering the sum-
mons and complaint in accordance with special agreement of the par-
ties or by complying with any applicable international convention.70
If service cannot be made in this manner a mailed translation sent
to the state's ministry of foreign affairs is sufficient to constitute
notice.71 Should that method prove ineffective the American
Secretary of State transmits notice through diplomatic channels.72
If the suit involves a foreign agency, notice is sent by the
method agreed upon by the parties or by delivery of the summons
and complaint to an authorized agent.73 When other methods fail,
service is either mailed to an authority of the foreign state or is
made as the forum court directs.7" These subtle differences in ser-
vice may necessitate an advance judicial determination of whether
the suit involves a foreign state or agency.
When suit commences in a state court, it decides the delicate
question of whether suit concerns a foreign state or agency. 5 Ac-
tions against foreign states may begin in a judicial district in which
a substantial part of the claim arose or where a substantial part of
the property that is the subject of the action is located.7" Additional-
69. SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 7; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 8.
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1976). See, e.g., the Hague Convention on Service
Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, in
force in the United States in 1969. Eighteen foreign states are parties to the con-
vention.
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3) (1976).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(4) (1976).
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b)(2) (1976).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b)(3) (1976).
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (1976).
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(1) (1976).
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ly, suits may commence against agencies wherever the agency is
licensed to do business.7
The Act expressly provides that suits against foreign states or
their political subdivisions may originate in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia."8 It would be easy for
foreign states to defend actions in Washington, D.C., since all,
foreign representatives have diplomatic headquarters there."' There
is thus a likelihood that more foreign states will litigate in the
District of Columbia than elsewhere.
A liberal provision allows both foreign states and agencies to
remove actions to a federal forum at their discretion." The Act's
grant of original jurisdiction to the federal courts expressly extends
to only nonjury civil actions;"1 and removal to federal court also
precludes the use of juries.2 These provisions argue for the
likelihood of congressional recognition that nonuniform or even pre-
judicial results might follow from trial to juries in state courts. This
congressional awareness should be understood as background to the
later discussion of specific execution uniformity problems.
The Act is carefully drafted to assert jurisdiction over foreign
states and still permit them to contract for a different choice of
forum." An agreement to arbitrate in another country can avoid
United States jurisdiction and specifications in a binding contract
that another country's laws are to govern suits arising out of it are
enforceable. 5 It is also possible to remove a suit to another country
on the doctrine of forum non conveniens when all of the re-
quirements for United States jurisdiction are met.' Furthermore, a
treaty may vary select portions of the Act. 7 Congressional respect
for sovereignty and recognition of our own stake in the preservation
of international comity compels deference to an express choice of
laws.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(fX3) (1976).
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(4) (1976).
79. SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 31; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 32.
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976). See SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 32; HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 7, at 32.
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976).
83. See notes 137-156 infra and accompanying text.
84. SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 16; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 16.
85. Id
86. See S. 566, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 2220 (1973).
87. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1609 (1976).
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In summary, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act codifies
the restrictive theory of immunity and asserts in personam jurisdic-
tion over foreign states and their agencies. The new commercial test
for jurisdiction is in line with the practice of countries following the
restrictive view. Several problems with the Act center on the new
jurisdiction, however, and include the foreign state-agency distinc-
tion and the grant of concurrent jurisdiction to state and federal
courts.
Despite congressional concern to treat sovereigns uniformly,
the likelihood is that the commercial test will devolve to a case-by-
case guess as to which foreign entity is before the court, with con-
current jurisdiction adding an unnecessary element of unpredic-
tability.
Through the execution provisions of the Act, judgment enforce-
ment alines with the new grant of in personam jurisdiction over
foreign states. These provisions illustrate another congressional
goal: the assurance of judgment satisfaction for United States na-
tionals.
EXECUTION UNDER THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
Even though execution provisions have been incorporated into
many of the bilateral commercial treaties between the United States
and certain foreign governments, judgment enforcement remains a
controversial issue in international law.' Initially, it appears that
88. "The enforcement of judgments against foreign state property remains a
somewhat controversial subject in international law. SENATE REPORT, supra note
7, at 26; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 27.
The United States is a party to approximately eighteen bilateral commercial
treaties. See MEHREN, supra note 34, at 139; TREATIES IN FORCE, Department of State
Publication 8891, January, 1977.
Commercial treaties typically provide for the execution of commercial assets.
An older example is The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Argen-
tina, in force Dec. 20, 1854, 10 STAT. 1005, T.S. 5, 5 BEVANS 61. It provides in part:
"Art. II. There shall [exist] between all the territories of the United States and all the
territories of the Argentine Confederation a reciprocal freedom of commerce. ... "
A modern example of the execution provision in a bilateral commercial treaty
is that of The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the Netherlands,
in force Dec. 5, 1957, 8 U.S.T. 2043; T.I.A.S. No. 3942; 285 U.N.T.S. 231, it provides in
part:
Art. XVIII 2. No enterprise of either Party, including corporations,
associations, and government agencies and instrumentalities, which is
publically owned or controlled shall, to the extent that it engages in com-
mercial, industrial, shipping or other business activities within the ter-
ritories of the other Party, claim or enjoy, either for itself or its property,
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much reliance is placed on the willingness of the foreign sovereign
to pay its judgments, so as to preclude utilization of the execution
provisions of the Act. Execution is now enforceable on both foreign
state and agency assets." Here the Act draws the same prob-
lematical distinction noted earlier, this time between state and
agency properties subject to execution. The new execution provi-
sions will assure the plaintiffs satisfaction yet may inherently of-
fend international expectations of deference.
Property of the Foreign State and Agency Subject to Execution
The Act's execution provisions represent the attainment of the
congressional goal of guaranteed judgment satisfaction, whatever
the desire of the foreign sovereign. In the same manner that the Act
creates exceptions to the general rule of sovereign immunity from
jurisdiction, these execution provisions establish exceptions to the
general rule of immunity from execution. In furtherance of the
policy of deference toward the foreign sovereign, the Act maintains
a distinction between executable state and agency assets. Considera-
tions of deference and reciprocity also prompted the creation of the
provision under which certain assets are exempt even though they
otherwise might fall within an executable category.
Diplomatic and consular properties remain immune from execu-
tion.w This is to be expected as a manifestation of the Vienna Con-
ventions." Property of organizations granted status under the Inter-
immunity therein from taxation, suit, execution of judgment or other
liability to which privately owned and controlled enterprises are subject
therein.
One such multilateral treaty is the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, in force for the United States Sept. 10, 1964,
15 U.S.T. 1606 T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205. The treaty allows execution in cer-
tain circumstances on state-owned vessels; forty-four countries are parties.
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (1976).
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(4) (1976).
91. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. This multilateral treaty entered into force in the
United States Dec. 13, 1972. One hundred twenty states are parties. Article 22 pro-
vides that the "premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon
and the means of transport of the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, at-
tachment or execution."
See also The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77
T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. This mulitlateral treaty entered into force in the
United States Dec. 24, 1969, with seventy-nine states parties. Article 43 abolishes con-
sular officer immunity for vehicular damage. Still, "no case relating to a traffic acci-
dent can be brought against a member of a diplomatic mission;" SENATE REPORT, supra
note 7, at 21; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 21.
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national Organizations Immunities Act" is also exempt from attach-
ment and execution in aid of judgment. 3 This immunity may be
waived, however, and the President of the United States may also'
limit, condition, or eliminate certain of these privileges without con-
gressional approval.
9 4
The property of a foreign central bank or monetary authority
is exempt, but this immunity too may be waived. 5 It is doubtful that
this provision was intended to extend in a blanket fashion to foreign
investments in United States corporations and industries" and thus
may need to be reexamined. In an attempt to protect itself from
reciprocity in foreign courts the legislature made all property of a
military character or under military control exempt. As a practical
matter, these exemptions establish nothing that is not already inter-
nationally extant. What is new is that certain commercial assets of
the foreign state and agency that are not otherwise exempt will be
subject to execution. The fundamental distinction the Act draws be-
tween the foreign state and foreign agency carries through into the
property execution provisions. Property of a foreign state itself is
executable when it is within the United States, provided the proper-
ty is commercial and is also the basis of the suit. Foreign state prop-
erties acquired by gift are also subject to execution."
In contrast to this provision, execution is permissible on the
property of agencies located anywhere in the United States'" and
the assets need not be commercial'' or relate to the precise nature
92. 22 U.S.C. § 288(a) (1968).
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (1976).
94. 22 U.S.C. § 288(a) (1968). The privileges may be waived "by contract." This
section also explains Presidential powers.
95. 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1) (1976).
96. Falk, supra note 18, at 495 (example of Arab investments in American
industries).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1611 (1976). Reciprocity is difficult to define but generally recog-
nized: "[The principle of reciprocity in the context of state immunity ... is far from hav-
ing a precise role ... but it could find a place in a part of the law which depends in practice
on mutual accomodation."
BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 328. See R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 45 (1964) ("all doctrines of deference in international law
rest upon a foundation of reciprocity").
98. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2) (1976).
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(4) (1976).
100. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b) (1976).
101. SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 29; HoUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 29.
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of the claim." ' The execution may thus relate to any commercial ac-
tivity having an effect in the United States.' 3 As with the foreign
state entity, properties which the agency receives as gifts are sub-
ject to execution.' 4
Noncommercial torts may now be prosecuted against foreign
states and agencies." 5 The Act's execution provision on noncommer-
cial torts appears, however, to be inapplicable to the foreign state
entity. Only noncommercial torts may be sued upon, and only com-
mercial property of the foreign state is executable in aid of the tort
judgment. The requirements that the property of the foreign state
must be commercial and also the basis of the claim will preclude
judgment enforcement. Thus no property of the foreign state will
ever be subject to execution under the Act for the satisfaction of a
noncommercial tort judgment, unless the sovereign waives immuni-
ty.' 6 Foreign agencies, on the other hand, are subject to execution
in aid of a noncommercial tort judgment on both commercial and
noncommercial property.' 7
There are obvious advantages that accrue under the Act to
foreign state entities which foreign agencies do not share. Noncom-
mercial agency property is always subject to execution while the
noncommercial property of a foreign state is not. As mentioned
earlier, execution is possible on agency property when a violation of
international law is found regardless of whether that property is
within the United States. This is true only when the agency engages
in a commercial activity within the United States."' Property of the
foreign state taken in violation of international law is not executable
unless that property is present in the United States. Thus it makes
a profound difference whether a suit involves the state or agency
for execution purposes.
Congress apparently felt the added decisional burden on a
court to be worth the deference to the sovereign these provisions
reflect. By thus acknowledging the sensitive nature of executions,
enforcement is allowed to proceed without the benefit of a treaty.
Once liability is found the foreign sovereign is encouraged to volun-
102. Id.
103. Id. See Falk, supra note 18, at 483. Falk argues that here the act
authorizes quasi in rem jurisdiction for agency property.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b)(2) (1976).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5), 1610 (1976).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1) (1976).
107. SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 29; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 29.
108. See notes 62-65 supra and accompanying text.
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tarily meet its judgment. When payment is not voluntarily made, a
successful plaintiff is nonetheless assured satisfaction through the
execution provisions of the Act.
At the outset it should be observed that if the foreign state
pays its judgment the Act's execution provisions do not activate."9
After entry of the judgment against a foreign sovereign, the court
must wait a "reasonable period of time" before ordering attachment
or execution in aid of the judgment."' In anticipation of the
sovereign's willingness to pay the judgment the Act provides a fair
opportunity to comply with the judicial order.
The Payment of Judgments By Foreign States
Congress established the execution provisions of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act without detailing execution procedures to
be used when a judgment is unsatisfied. This omission may have
been an oversight. If so, there is no rationale for the Act's failure to
provide procedures for judgment enforcement that appear to follow
naturally from the Act's grant of power to execute. It is also possi-
ble that the omission was a planned consequence of the unannounced
premise that a foreign state would pay its judgments voluntarily
when found liable in the United States.
The proposition that the Act is completely premised on the
foreign sovereign's willingness to pay, however, does not withstand
close scrutiny for two reasons. First, the new Act changes previous
law with respect to plaintiffs entitlement to judgment enforcement
against foreign sovereigns. The Act's reliance on the foreign state's
voluntary payment did not result in provision for payment when
quasi in rem jurisdiction was asserted. Second, if total reliance was
placed on the sovereign's willingness to pay its judgments, there
would simply be no need for the execution provisions that are in-
cluded in the Act.
Several contingencies may prevent rapid collectability of a
judgment against a foreign entity. These include the possibility that
in some countries other branches of a foreign government must first
109. 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (1976), defines the exceptions to immunity from execution
that will activate when there is non-payment of a judgment.
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(c) provides:
No attachment or execution referred to in subsections (a) and (b) of this
section shall be permitted until the court has ordered such attachment
and execution after having determined that a reasonable period of time
has elapsed following the entry of judgment and the giving of any notice
required under section 1608(e) of this chapter.
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authorize the payment."' Property that is sought for satisfaction of
a judgment may not be commercial as required under the Act,"
may lie outside the court's jurisdiction to attach,' or may have been
fraudulently conveyed."' Further, those countries following the ab-
solute theory of immunity, expecting reciprocity in United States
courts, may not feel compelled to pay a judgment they would not
pay at home."5 Even countries following the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity have stopped short of executing their own
courts' judgments."' To compound these possible problems, interna-
tional law is in a state of flux on the issue of acceptability of judg-
ment enforcement provisions. In the recent past foreign states have
lobbied with the State Department in an effort to secure as much
immunity from jurisdiction as they could obtain."7 With immunity
from jurisdiction denied, foreign states may yet seek State Depart-
ment intervention to prevent judgment enforcement.
111. See, e.g., Comment, Sovereign Immunity-Waiver And Execution"
Arguments From Continental Jurisprudence, 74 YALE L. J. 887, 914 (1965) (noting that
Italy and Greece cannot order execution without the prior approval of the executive
branch).
112. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1610 (1976).
113. The Act deals exclusively with in personam jurisdiction. It has been
criticized for not allowing quasi in rem jurisdiction over foreign states by Falk, supra
note 18, at 483, because no jurisdiction can be asserted when the foreign state or agen-
cy owns property in the United States but does not satisfy the commercial nexus text
of § 1605 of the Act.
114. There are obvious limits to a court's power to inquire into the activities
and laws of foreign states. See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (Oregon
statute permitting non-resident alien to inherit personalty only if United States
citizens enjoyed reciprocal rights was invalidated since it required more than routine
examination of foreign laws).
115. This follows from the general "no-greater-effect-than-at-home" doctrine in
use among the several states of the United States. See, e.g., MEHREN, supra note 34, at
65. It has been held, however, that it is not necessary for the domestic sovereign to
permit execution in order to execute against foreign sovereigns, Socobelge v. Greek
State, 79 Clunet 244, 18 Int'l L. Rep. 3 (Civil Tribunal Brussels, 1951). See also Falk,
supra note 18, at 492.
116. "The majority of states concede immunity in respect of measures of execu-
tion directed against property of foreign states .. " BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 331.
See generally 6 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 709-26 (1968).
117. The State Department could hardly remain neutral when pressed for an
immunity grant by foreign governments. This may be a reason why the State Depart-
ment, in helping to draft the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, did not write a role
for itself in the determination process. See Fed. Reg. 50, 884 (1976).
The State Department can use diplomatic channels to obtain the payment of
judgments. As stated by the United States in its brief in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964):
The important benefit of executive diplomatic action is that it is not
restricted, as is judicial action, to cases which, by happenstance, come
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Despite these problems the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
grants execution privileges to successful plaintiffs. There may be no
problem of judgment enforcement against certain foreign states.
Countries which are parties to various commercial treaties have
already agreed to permit execution on certain commercially held
assets."" Customary international law,"' through these treaties, may
be said to promote judgment enforcement. 20 The fact that many
countries already pay for their adverse judgments through a treaty
is one encouragement for them to pay when found to be liable in
United States courts.2 '
There are other good reasons why the foreign state would
desire to pay, including enhanced diplomatic relations and general
good business practice."2 Whatever the reasons for or against pay-
ment the very existence of the Act now provides an added incentive
for plaintiffs to seek satisfaction of judgments whenever possible.
Money damages, injunctions, and specific performance may be
within the jurisdiction of American courts. . . . The efforts of the
Executive Branch to achieve general compensation for claims of all United
States nationals . . . have in the past met with success.
Brief for the United States, 2 INrL LEGAL MATERIALS 1009-10 (1963).
118. See note 88 supra.
119. This is defined as "evidence of a general practice accepted as law" in the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, U.N. CHARTER, Art. 38.
Brownlie notes that the "evidence" includes diplomatic correspondence, policy
statements, executive decisions, and opinions of official legal advisors, BROWNLIE, supra
note 3, at 5. Custom is important to a formulation of international law as "formal
sources" do not exist. The general "consent of states creates rules of general applica-
tion." Id at 2.
120. At least, this is the view of the United States. See SENATE REPORT, supra
note 7, at 26-7; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 27.
121. A foreign sovereign may, however, argue the converse: that execution on
certain commercial assets is permissible only through a treaty. See note 88 supra.
122. See Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States-A Proposal For Reform
of United States Law, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 928-9 (1969):
A combination of commercial and diplomatic pressure would probably in-
duce governments that have an interest in maintaining good commercial
reputations in the United States and good diplomatic relations with this
country to pay judgments that have become final after due notice and full
opportunity to contest on the merits.
See also Lauterpacht, The Problem Of Jurisdictional Immunities Of Foreign States,
28 BRITISH Y. B. OF INT'L LAW 220, 242-3 (1951):
It is significant that states affected by measures of execution have not as
a rule protested against it as being unlawful. In fact it may be difficult to
adduce reasons of principle which would require in the matter of exe-
ection a rule different from that obtaining in the matter of jurisdiction on
the merits.
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awarded to the successful plaintiff,2 ' although the injunctions and
specific performance may continue to be unenforceable.' 4 Because
rule 69 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure controls the prac-
tices of judgment enforcement under the Act, the successful plaintiff
may be awarded any relief a private person could be compelled to
perform under applicable state law, except the payment of punitive
damages.'
Summarizing the new judicial power, the permissibility of judg-
ment execution against foreign countries in United States courts
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, represents a unique
American addition to the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.
Still, considerations of deference and comity underlie the scope of
execution that will be permitted against foreign sovereigns. They
will be encouraged to voluntarily comply with judicial orders and
will have a time allowance in which to demonstrate a good faith at-
tempt to meet their judgments. To the extent that the sovereign's
willingness to pay its judgment is a factor in the probability of the
plaintiffs obtainment of satisfaction, it may be said that interna-
tional precedent exists and makes voluntary payment a likely occur-
rence. When combined, the execution clauses in commercial treaties,
the United States' policy of prompt accounting abroad and the im-
portance of perpetuating good business practices may be persuasive
enough to preclude the need for enforced judgments. The Act's ex-
ecution provisions are also incentives for voluntary compliance with
judicial orders. Whether it pays its judgment voluntarily or is sub-
ject to an enforced execution will be the sovereign's choice. The true
test of the Act's success thus lies in the operability of the execution
provisions which attempt to assure the payment of judgments even
when payment is not freely made.
Once the execution provisions of the Act have been activated,
their practical application depends on rule 69 of the Federal Rules of
123. 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1976), provides in part:
As to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign state is not
entitled to immunity under section 1605 or 1607 of this chapter, the
foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as
a private individual under like circumstances; but a foreign state except
for an agency or instrumentality thereof shall not be liable for punitive
damages.
124. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 22; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at
22.
125. This is a logical extension of the United States domestic policy of not
allowing punitive damages against the national government, expressed in 28 U.S.C. §
2674 (1968).
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Civil Procedure. Rule 69 provides that the prevailing procedures of
judgment enforcement in the several American states are to be
utilized to obtain the satisfaction of judgments against foreign
sovereigns. State law thus controls judgment lives, the appraisal
and sale of goods on execution, provisional remedies, differing lien
time limits and much more. To understand the practical effects of
this rule, it is necessary to examine the procedures of judgment ex-
ecution which it makes applicable.
PROCEDURES OF JUDGMENT EXECUTION UNDER RULE 69
By its terms rule 69 opens the door to the application of the ex-
ecution laws of the several American states. What emerges as the
logically controlling rationale for the omission of execution pro-
cedures from the Act is that the practices operative in the fifty
states and the District of Columbia will somehow achieve all of the
desired congressional goals, including deference, predictability and
uniformity. The absence of execution procedures within the Act thus
leads to a remarkable result: an attempt is made to transform the
laws of fifty-one jurisdictions into a uniform standard for the pur-
pose of executing judgments against foreign sovereigns. Such a
transformation is impossible in view of congressional goals. Perhaps
in return for the privilege of doing business in the United States,
Congress approved of the forfeiture of foreign convenience. Even so,
a foreign state will yet expect continuing deference, predictability
and uniformity from a foreign law that impinges on its sovereign im-
munity.
This discussion first examines the applicability of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure through which the execution provisions of
the Act operate. A brief survey of the execution procedures of the
several states follows. It should be apparent that state law, con-
cededly effective within a state's own borders, fails not only as a
uniform standard of judgment enforcement but also as a mechanism
for the attainment of the strong policy goals behind the Act.
Applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 69 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure performs three
functions under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. First, it
renders the execution provisions of the Act operable by providing
procedures for judgment execution. Second, the use of rule 69 im-
plies the relevance of other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which
in turn establish additional execution remedies. Finally, it is through
rule 69 that Congress has articulated the applicability of state ex-
ecution law to suits against foreign sovereigns.
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Federal Rule 69121 controls the process of judgment enforce-
ment through the use of writs of execution. While rule 69 is
operative only to enforce the payment of money, the Act also ad-
dresses the feasibility of specific performance."n By implication,
through the use of rule 69, other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
come into play which affect the remedies available under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Federal Procedural Rule 702"
controls supplementary proceedings and executions that order the
performance of specific acts. It is likely that specific performance
could be granted under the Act but a caveat must follow since en-
forcement cannot be assured.
Provisional remedies are available under the Act,'" and by im-
plication, derive from Federal Rules 64130 and 65.'' Some of these
remedies have come under recent constitutional attack1 2 and their
availability is dependent on both foreign consent to their use' 3 and
on their vitality under applicable state law. When the foreign state
consents, its property may be attached before the entry of judgment
or before the lapse of a "reasonable time" after the judgment's en-
try."M It is doubtful, however, that a foreign state would consent to
126. See note 27 supra.
127. See note 123 supra.
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 70 provides in part:
If a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land or to
deliver deeds or other documents or to perform any other specific act and
the party fails to comply within the time specified, the court may direct
the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party .... The court may
also in proper cases adjudge the party in contempt.
129. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(d) (1976).
130. FED. R. Civ. P. 64 provides in part:
At the commencement of and during the course of an action, all remedies
providing for seizure of person or property for the purpose of securing
satisfaction of the judgment ultimately to be entered in the action are
available under the circumstances and in the manner provided by the law
of the state in which the district court is held. . . . The remedies thus
available include arrest, attachment, garnishment, replevin, sequestration,
and other corresponding or equivalent remedies....
131. FED. R. Civ. P. 65 provides for the use of injunctions and temporary
restraining orders.
132. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). See also North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975). These cases do not question the constitutionality of attach-
ment for purely jurisdictional reasons. See generally Levy, Attachment, Garnishment
And Garnishment Executio: Some American Problems Considered In The Light Of
The English Experience, 5 CONN. L. REv. 399 (1972-3).
133. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(d) (1976).
134. Id
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attachment if it was desirous of removing property from a court's
jurisdiction. Thus plaintiffs resort to the use of provisional
remedies against a foreign sovereign defendant may often be only a
theoretical possibility at best."5
This background is helpful for an understanding of the inter-
relationship of state and federal law under the existing Act. The
relationship must be understood not simply because the Act is new
United States law, but also because international law may now be
affected by the enforcement procedures of the several American
states. A clearer picture of the effect of the utilization of these rules
develops when they are applied in their proper settings in state and
federal courts.
Execution In State Courts
In order to show the nonuniformity of state execution pro-
cesses it is necessary to consider only a few illustrative jurisdic-
tions. This note does not attempt to survey the entire field of judg-
ment enforcement practice in the several states. For the most part,
federalism dictates that state law controls the particulars of ex-
ecuting judgments in federal, courts." Although they follow
noticeable trends, the execution procedures in the fifty states differ
greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The many different state
practices often indicate conflicting views as to redemption rights,
life of judgment and execution liens and capacities for judgment
renewal or revival. The preceeding discussion demonstrates that
foreign states are now subjected to these differences through the
execution provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It follows that the utilization
of state execution laws will not achieve the congressional goals of
uniformity and deference.
135. The foreign state could no doubt use provisional remedies against private
persons when it brings the action. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4) (1976), a foreign state
has the express right to sue as plaintiff.
See also Anderson v. Tucker, 68 F.R.D. 461 (1975) (state rules applied under rule
69(a) are to be applied in a common sense manner; incongruous results under state law
will not be incorporated as part of the federal practice under the rule). See Yazoo and
M.V. R.R. Co. v. Clarksdale, 257 U.S. 10 (1921) (conformity to state practice does not
demand a literal conformity that is impossible or impracticable).
136. Under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), state law applies in the
federal courts to all matters not governed by the Federal Constitution or Acts of Con-
gress. While the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is an Act of Congress, the
applicability of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69 renders state execution law effec-
tive, even in the federal courts.
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Foreign states will find that enforcement methods vary depend-
ing on which interests are sought for satisfaction of the judgment in
particular states. In most states the process used for obtaining en-
forcement of a judgment is a writ of execution.'37 To effect the pro-
cess of executing the judgment the sheriff of the appropriate county
levies on assets subject to the writ, selling them at a public sale.'38
Diverse state statutes dictate the form the levy takes and may in-
volve recordation or the posting of notice.'39 The writ in most
jurisdictions reaches real estate and chattels and will execute by
seizure and sale.' In other jurisdictions the writ reaches realty but
enforcement is by foreclosure in equity." In some jurisdictions the
writ does not reach land at all."' Foreign states must also study the
differing life spans of writs of execution that they are now subject
to or that they may wish to utilize as plaintiffs. Writs of execution
generally have limited lives.'
4
1
A further distinction made in the majority of the states is be-
tween judgment liens and execution liens. The judgment lien
generally affects only real estate and varies in duration, methods of
137. S. RIESENFELD, CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 86 (2d ed.
1975).
138. Id. at 95.
139. Id. at 131 n.5.
140. Riesenfeld, Collection of Money Judgments in American Law-A
Historical Inventory And A Prospectus, 42 IOWA L. REV. 155 (1957) [hereinafter cited
as Collection of Money Judgments].
141. Id.
142. Other methods, however, allow the execution of land by enforcing judg-
ment liens in equity. VA. CODE §§ 8-399, 8-400, 8-391 (1950); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§
3784-85, 5527, 3769 (1955). Another method is "set off' which transfers land in fee to
the judgment creditor at an appraised value. ME. REV. STAT. c, 171, §§ 31 (1954); MASS
ANN. LAWS c. 235, §§ 6ff, 26ff (1956); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 529.1ff, 529.19ff (1955).
143. These states allow a writ life of sixty days: CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 683
(West Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.05 (1947); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 5230(c)
(McKinney 1963).
In these states the life is ninety days: IND. CODE § 35-1-34-8 (1971). (The creditor
may shorten this period); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, § 8 (1973); MICH. Coe. LAWS ANN. §
600.6002 (Supp. 1977); NJ. Civ. P. RULES, rule 4:59-1 (1972); PA. RULES OF CIV. PROC.,
rule 3106(d) (1953); VERNON'S ANN. TEXAS RULES OF CIV. PROC., rule 621 (1972).
In Maryland the date is fixed by court rule, MD. R.C.P., rule 102 (1977); COURTS
AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ART. § 2-304(A) (1973), while in Florida the writ is valid for
the life of the judgment, generally twenty years. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 56.021, 56.041
(1969).
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enforcement,' the interests it may cover," 5 and its assurance of
adequate valuation on sale of the property.'6 The execution lien, in
contrast, may reach both real property and chattels.' 7 In about half
of the American jurisdictions an execution lien arises by delivering
the writ of execution to the sheriff.'48 In others the levy creates the
lien.'49 All of these differences are important to a foreign sovereign
since the scope and method of execution will affect its business
assets.
Perhaps the best example of the subjection of foreign states to
a myriad of diverse and unpredictable laws arises from an examina-
tion of "dormancy" statutes. In American practice the three at-
tributes of a personal money judgment-executability, actionability,
and operation of the lien-all came to have their own separate ex-
istences with their own separate statutes of limitations.50 Today,
many states limit the time within which a writ of execution may
144. There are four basic methods of enforcing judgment liens. First, one
method is foreclosure in equity as used in Connecticut and Virginia. See CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 49-44 to 49-47 (1960); Hobbs v. Simmonds, 61 Conn. 235, 23 A. 962 (1891); VA.
CODE §§ 8-399, 8-400, 8-391 (1950).
Another method of enforcement is levy and sale under a writ of execution as used
in Rhode Island, Vermont, Florida, and Minnesota. See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-26-14 to
9-26-19 (1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 §§ 2781-2800 (1973). See also Grantz v. First Nat.
Bank of Miami, 138 So. 2d 367 (Fla. App. 1962); Thompson v. Dale, 58 Minn. 365, 59
N.W. 1086 (1894).
A third method is to combine foreclosure and levy and sale as in use in New
Mexico, Texas and Alabama. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-1-22, 24-1-25 (1953). See also
Baker v. West, 120 Tex. 113, 36 S.W.2d 695 (1931); Erlenbach v. Cox, 206 Ala. 298, 89
So. 465 (1921).
A final method combines aspects of the three methods examined above, through
a writ of enforcement. See Collection Of Money Judgments, supra note 140, at 164-71.
145. The American jurisdictions are divided on the issue of whether equitable
interests in land are subject to the judgment lien, or whether only legal interests are
subject. California, Indiana, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, and Texas recognize only legal
interests. In contrast, equitable interests in Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, New Mexico,
Pennsylvania, and Washington are subject to judgment liens. See RIESENFELD, supra
note 137, at 117 n.1.
146. See generally RIESENFELD, supra note 137.
147. See RIESENFELD, supra note 137, at 94.
148. Among the many states recognizing the creation of the execution lien by
delivery are Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 30-116 (1962); Colorado, CoLo. REV. STAT. §
77-1-12 (1963); Indiana, IND. CODE § 34-1-34-9 (1973); and Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. §
426.120 (1970). See RIESENFELD, supra note 137, at 155.
149. Among the states recognizing the execution lien's creation by levy are
Montana, MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-5810 (1964); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1504
(1964); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 21.080 (1973); and Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 23.410(5)
(1974).
150. See Collection of Money Judgments, supra note 140, at 156.
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issue to a period of from one to twenty years, and most provide pro-
cedures for judgment revival, renewal or extension.15' Foreign states
may wish to take advantage of the running of various statutes of
limitations. The vast differences in dormancy statutes, however,
merely compound the sovereign's predictability problem."'
These varying judgment lives, their capacity for renewal or
revival, and the differing time limits on their liens are compelling
evidence of the absurd lack of uniformity operable under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act as it now stands. The incongruity
of the foreign sovereign's position in American courts should be ap-
parent. These diverse execution practices apply to foreign
sovereigns under the guise of a uniform standard. Foreign
sovereigns seek the uniform standard because the several states
have no international status. The sovereign may decide that not-
withstanding the Act's attempts at deference any subjection to state
law violates its sovereignty. Lack of uniformity among states is,
from the foreign state's view, an added and aggravated affront. In
view of the sensitive nature of enforced executions, United States
practice cannot help but appear burdensome.
Turning to redemption statutes, half of the American jurisdic-
tions permit the judgment debtor to buy his own realty back at the
public sale.'53 No redemption rights exist, however, in Connecticut,
Florida, Indiana, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina,
or Oklahoma, among other states.'" No right of redemption exists in-
dependently under federal law.'55
A foreign sovereign may wish to repurchase its own property
at an execution sale. It is conceivable that the judgment creditor
and the sovereign might be the only bidders at such a sale. Where
redemption rights do not exist and the sovereign wishes to repur-
chase, adherence to state law offends the goal of deference. Even
when redemption rights do exist under state law they do not
151. I&
152. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, § 6 (1963) (judgment dormant after seven
years); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3773 (1966) (ten years); IND. CODE § 34-1-34-1
(1971) (ten years); WASH. REV. CODE § 6.04.010 (1963) (ten years); WASH. REV. CODE §
4.56.210 (1963). See Ball v. Bussel, 119 Wash. 206, 205 P. 423 (1922) (no action to renew
past six year life); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 18.360, 12.070 (1974); see Mason v. Mason, 148 Or.
34, 34 P.2d 328 (1934) (no renewal, but judgment lien may be extended one ten year
period); S.C. CODE § 10-1520 (1962) (renewal only by leave of court).
153. See RIESENFELD, supra note 137, at 150.
154. Id
155. United States v. Heasley, 283 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1960).
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guarantee a fair price. Upset prices could help to assure the ade-
quate valuation of foreign state properties taken on execution.
When a state does not provide statutory redemption rights, it
generally does have provisions establishing an upset price below
which the property cannot be sold.15
In summary, differing state execution practices reduce the con-
gressional goal of procedural uniformity to a mere abstract ideal and
inject an element of tension into a sensitive area where deference
may be the most effective instrument of such policy. Foreign states
expect United States laws to apply to them as expressions of the na-
tional power. The divergent enforcement procedures of the several
states do not answer this need for a uniform, national standard of
enforcement.
Congressional policies of deference, predictability and uniformi-
ty seek to ease international friction over the assertion of the power
to execute judgments. Reliance on state execution laws aggravates
rather than eases this friction. There is, however, an easy solution
to these difficulties. An amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act could give exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts
and provide a uniform federal execution procedure.
AN ARGUMENT FOR UNIFORMITY
Several congressional policies have coalesced in the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act. Perhaps the most significant recognized
desire is to treat the foreign sovereign uniformly. It is through
deference that the Act achieves its execution objective while respect-
ing the sovereign equality of other nations. Deference to the
sovereign can be found in the Act's liberal removal provision,'57 in
the waiver provisions," in the exempt property provision,"9 and in
the provision restricting the use of provisional remedies.'" The Act
itself carries a tone of deference, because only exceptions to the
general rule of sovereign immunity create United States jurisdic-
tion. The fact remains that foreign states expect sovereign immuni-
156. While they are not available everywhere, the following jurisdictions allow
the use of upset prices: IND. CODE § 24-1-37-1 (1971). See also IND. T.R. 69 (1970); KAN.
STAT. § 60-2415(b) (1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-2-5 (1954); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2329.20 (1975); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 762 (1971); and federal courts under 28 U.S.C. §
2001 (1970).
157. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976).
158. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(1), 1610(a)(1) (1976).
159. 28 U.S.C. § 1611 (1976).
160. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(c) and (d) (1976).
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ty. No country has an absolute right to assert jurisdiction or to ex-
ecute judgments over another without a treaty. Deference and comi-
ty are the international tenets of respect for the sovereignty and
equality of other countries; both rely on reciprocity for their
perpetuation. In granting judicial powers to execute judgments
against foreign sovereigns, Congress expands the accepted theory of
restrictive immunity and treads heavily in a politically sensitive
area.
As noted earlier, the several states have no international
status. Yet, because the Act grants concurrent jurisdiction to
federal and state courts, foreign sovereigns must now submit to the
complex judicial systems of fifty states, the District of Columbia and
the federal courts. Evidence of the nonuniformity of state execution
procedures is abundant. State enforcement laws vary as to scope
and coverage of liens, methods of lien enforcement and statutes of
limitations periods. The allowance of jury trials in state courts also
leads to potentially nonuniform results.
Concurrent jurisdiction in this context blurs the constitutional
separation of state and federal power. It is simply doubtful that
fifty-one diverse practices can achieve the congressional goals of
deference, predictability and uniformity. Such practices fit uneasily
into a national pattern; much less so may they be said to articulate a
national standard of enforcement procedure. Foreign sovereigns
will, however, expect a national standard to govern the resolution of
all issues arising from the new Act. Despite a long history of
freedom to initiate suits of their own in United States courts,
foreign sovereigns have never before been subjected to enforced ex-
ecution of adverse judgments in the United States. '
The important and delicate difference between the foreign
state and its agency, maintained under the Act for jurisdiction and
execution purposes, may be a state court determination. State
courts may, therefore, apply international law in resolving issues.
Incorrect adjudications of sovereign immunity issues in state courts
will naturally embarrass the State Department." In view of the an-
161. The Sapphire, 78 U.S. (11 Wall) 164 (1871) (holding that a foreign state
may sue in United States courts; the only requirement is that the sovereign be
"recognized" by the United States Government).
162. As the act of state cases in this Court have repeatedly recognized,
exechtive diplomatic action may be seriously impeded or embarrassed by
American judicial decisions which undertake... to pass upon the validity
of foreign acts.
Brief for the United States, as amicus curiae, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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nounced expertise of the federal courts in matters of international
law,"6 this embarrassment is an unnecessary risk. Beneath all of
these factors lies express federal power to preempt the several
states when suits commence against foreign countries."M The
strongest and best argument for exclusive federal jurisdiction is the
constitutional grant of power to the federal judiciary.
It is thus evident that there is a clash between articulated con-
gressional policies and the realities of the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act. In form, adjudication in a federal forum is encouraged
because of the liberal removal provision, the absence of jurisdic-
tional amount, the sensitivity of the issues, and the expertise of the
federal courts. In substance, however, state law controls the enforce-
ment process and concurrent jurisdiction subjects foreign
sovereigns to multifarious laws and social climates.
An amendment to the Act giving federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction over suits by or against foreign states and providing a
uniform enforcement process could remove these deficiencies.115
Such an amendment would properly involve the federal system in
the determination of all foreign sovereign immunity questions.
An amendment could also eliminate any doubts about predic-
tability by introducing a single execution process. Congress could
again control deference to foreign sovereigns, extend it where
necessary and curtail it where reciprocity dictates. The uniform pro-
cedure for enforcing judgments against foreign sovereigns should in-
clude uniform statutes of limitations for the three components of the
163. Congress has noted that: "[The federal courts may be expected to have a
greater familiarity with international law and with the trend of decisions in foreign
states than would be true of courts of the States." See 119 CONG. REC. 2219 (1973).
164. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 provides in part:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under the Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;- . . . -to Con-
troversies . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects.
165. Lowenfeld has argued for exclusive jurisdiction in this context. His pro-
posed Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act did not, however, contain
execution provisions. See Lowenfeld, supra note 122, at 930-36.
The International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes be-
tween States and Nationals of other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No.
6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, seeks to aid the enforcement of foreign country judgement in
the United States. See MEHREN, supra note 34, at 15-60. The federal courts have ex-
clusive jurisdiction to enforce the Convention, 22 U.S.C. § 1650(a) (1966). Thus, ex-
clusive federal jurisdiction is effective in contexts similar to those of the execution pro-
visions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
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personal money judgment, the action, the execution and the lien. Ad-
ditionally, the amendment should specify the scope and coverage,
methods of enforcement and duration of appropriate liens. Uniform
appraisal and redemption rights would assure adequate valuation of
sovereign property taken on execution. Finally, the amendment
should outline all appropriate remedies and exemptions so that
foreign sovereigns need not guess at the scope of their property
rights in the United States.
Any amendment designed to promote uniformity under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act will benefit not only foreign
sovereigns, but also United States plaintiffs. In this sensitive area,
foreign governments simply cannot respect enforcement procedures
that offend sovereignty. A uniform Act will receive foreign respect
and compliance. Thus while it achieves deference, predictability and
uniformity, the amendment can advance the other important policy
goal of judgment satisfaction for United States nationals. Absent
the needed amendment, the Act falls sadly short of its potential for
clarifying the American position on its disciplinary jurisdiction over
foreign states and for obtaining congressional goals.
CONCLUSION
Successful judgment enforcement under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 depends on two interrelated factors. The
sovereign defendant must have the capacity and willingness to pay
its judgment. The court must have effective judgment enforcement
procedures. As a practical matter, the foreign sovereign has a great
deal to gain both diplomatically and commercially by submitting to a
United States court's judicial order. International precedent for en-
forced execution has been set by the multilateral and bilateral com-
mercial treaties. The Act's exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign
immunity are in accord with prevailing international sentiment.
Commercial practice of the United States abroad is currently consis-
tent with the new Act and represents a policy of respect for the
judgments of foreign courts. As the Congress suggests with the
Act's passage, it is time for other countries to demonstrate a similar
deference.
It is likely that foreign sovereigns will often respect United
States' court judgments. When the sovereign does not voluntarily
comply with a judicial order, however, the Act's execution provi-
sions activate to obtain the satisfaction of judgments. While prob-
lems with the distinction between state and agency properties sub-
ject to execution under the Act are certain to develop, United
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States courts will be able to apply both international and domestic
law to the resolution of this justiciable issue.
The new Act also addresses the larger issue of the proper role
of domestic courts in the settlement of suits between United States
nationals and foreign governments. Until an international treaty is
in force on the subject of sovereign immunity, no country will have
an absolute right to assert jurisdiction or to execute judgments over
another. The Act is not an aggressive or dictatorial statement of
America's jurisdictional power. Rather, it is a timely expression of
the extent to which considerations of deference and comity still con-
trol United States foreign policy. At every turn the Act rejects ab-
solutism. Concurrently, the Act is sensitive to the legal needs of
American plaintiffs. Whether the Act will be successful in in-
tegrating the potentially conflicting goals of respect for sovereignty
with its commitment to provide a legal forum for United States na-
tionals is the question that must await international response.
It cannot be doubted that the test of the Act's strength lies in
its execution provisions. Procedures of judgment enforcement that
are both predictable and uniform would assure not only the attain-
ment of the congressional goals behind the Act, but also the satisfac-
tion of plaintiffs' judgments. Congress has expressed a desire to
treat foreign sovereigns uniformly, yet under the Act state courts
have jurisdiction to hear cases against foreign sovereigns. State law
controls the procedures of judgment enforcement in those courts
and also in federal courts, because of the applicability of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. This note argues that the jurisdictional
grant to the several states is unwise, and that the use of the laws of
the several states to enforce judgments does not achieve uniformity
and involves, instead, unnecessary uncertainty and unpredictability.
The major defect blocking fulfillment of the congressional goals
behind the Act is indeed curable. An amendment to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 granting exclusive jurisdiction to
the federal courts and providing a single federal execution pro-
cedure will assure the uniform treatment of foreign sovereigns in
United States courts.
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